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Abstract: Based on the MRDP theorem concerning the Hilbert tenth problem, there is a 
corresponding Diophantine equation called proof equation for every formula of the First-order 
Peano Arithmetic (PA). A formula is provable in PA, if and only if the corresponding proof 
equation has solution. Based on proof equation, some famous sentences, e.g., the Gödel sentence, 
the Rosser sentence and the Henkin sentence, can be expressed by the form of Diophantine 
equation. It is proved that for every axiom and theorem in the PA, we can construct actually a 
corresponding Diophantine equation, for which we know that it has no solution, but this fact 
cannot be proved in the PA. This means that, for every axiom and theorem in the PA, we can 
construct actually a corresponding undecidable proposition. Finally, generalizing the idea of proof 
equation to any mathematical (set theoretical, number theoretical, algebraic, geometrical, 
topological, et al) proposition, a project translating the task seeking a proof of the mathematical 
proposition into solving a corresponding Diophantine equation is discussed. 
 
 
 
1  The proof equation for any formula of PA 
 
First-order Peano Arithmetic System (PA) is discussed in many standard reference books. In 
this paper, all the convention of the symbols, the terms, the formulas, the axiom schema, the 
deductive rules, the proof of a formula of PA and all the corresponding Gödel codes follows the 
Ref. [1]. Some systems weaker than PA, e.g., the system Q [2, 3] , are mentioned occasionally. 
The solutions of an arbitrary Diophantine equation discussed in this paper are restricted to 
the set of natural numbers {0, 1, 2, …}. At first, we investigate simply the representability of 
Diophantine equation in PA. 
According to the representability of recursive functions, an arbitrary polynomial D({al}, {xm}) 
with natural number coefficients can be represented by a formula d({xal}, {xn}) in PA, where {al}, 
{xm} are the abbreviation of the parameters a1, a2, …, al and the variables x1, x2, …, xm, 
respectively. For obtaining d({xal}, {xn}) , what we need to do is only to translate every parameter 
ai in D({al}, {xm}) into xai, aiu into , every unknown x
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aiaiai xxx × j in D({al}, {xm}) into xj, xjv 
into  and every constant b
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jjj xxx × n into the term 0′′…′ (There are bn successors “′”), which 
is abbreviated as bn′. The symbols in PA are expressed by boldface in this paper.  
And, further, an arbitrary Diophantine equation D({al}, {xm})=0 can be rewritten as DL({al}, 
{xm})=DR({al}, {xm}), where both DL({al}, {xm}) and DR({al}, {xm}) are polynomials with natural 
number coefficients. Let the representations in PA of DL({al}, {xm}) and DR({al}, {xm}) be 
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dL({xal}, {xn}) and dR({xal}, {xn}), respectively, then the representation of D({al}, {xm})=0 in PA 
is d({xal}, {xn}), where d({xal}, {xn}) is the formula dL({xal}, {xn})=dR({xal}, {xn}). 
We therefore have 
Lemma 1. For an arbitrary polynomial predicate D({xn})=0, There is a formula d({xn}) in PA 
such that  
If D({bn})=0, then PA┣ d({bn}′); If D({bn})≠0, then PA┣ ┑d({bn}′). 
Corollary 1. Let d(1)({xl}) and d(2)({xm}) are the representational formulas of the 
Diophantine equations D(1)({xl})=0 and D(2)({xm})=0, respectively, then representational formulas 
of the equations D(1)({xl+m})=(D(1)({xl}))2+(D(2)({xm}))2=0 and D(2)({xl+m})=D(1)({xl}) •
D(2)({xm})=0 are d(1)({xl0}′)∧d(2)({xm0}′) and d(1)({xl0}′)∨d(2)({xm0}′), respectively. 
Lemma 2. Let d({xn}) be the representational formula in PA of a Diophantine equation 
D({xn})=0, then 
(1) If D({xn})=0 has solution then PA┣∃{xn} d({xn});  
(2) If PA is ω-consistent, then if PA┣∃{xn} d({xn}), then the equation D({xn})=0 has 
solution. 
Proof: (1) Immediate from Lemma 1. 
(2) If PA┣ {x∃ n}d({xn}), namely, PA┣ ┑∀ {xn}┑d({xn}). Suppose D({xn})=0 has no 
solution, from Lemma 1 we have PA┣ ┑d({ln}′) for any {ln}′. Hence, all the formulas ┑d({ln}′) 
for any {ln}′ and ┑∀ {xn}┑d({xn} are provable in PA, and hence PA is ω-inconsistency.  
Remark 1. (1) The notion of ω-consistency is about a formula A(x) of PA with just one free 
variable x. For the proof of Lemma 2, we should use the n-fold form of ω-consistency called 
“ωn-consistency[3]”, because there are many free variables {xn} but not one free variable in d({xn}). 
However, according to the following lemma in Ref.[3, §2]: “Suppose R0⊆T. If T is ω-consistency, 
the T is ωk-consistency, for all k”, we can use only the condition of ω-consistency in the proof of 
the result (2) of Lemma 2. 
(2) For the result (2) of Lemma 2, the condition of ω-consistency is necessary. In fact, there 
is a system in which all the formulas ┑d({ln}′) for any {ln}′ and ┑∀ {xn}┑d({xn} are provable. 
The system D in the Ref.[3] can be as an example, because D contains an infinite element. Just as 
Ref.[3] concludes, the system D is ω-inconsistency. 
(3) If D({xn})=0 has no solution, from Lemma 1 we have PA┣ ┑d({ln}′) for any {ln}′. In 
this case, even if the condition of ω-consistency is used, what we can obtain is only the conclusion 
“not PA┣ ┑∀ {xn}┑d({xn})”, e.g., “not PA┣∃{xn}d({xn})”, we cannot obtain the conclusion 
“PA┣ {x∀ n}┑d({xn})”. In fact, there is equation D({xn})=0 which has no solution but the 
corresponding formula {x∀ n}┑d({xn}) is not provable in PA. We shall investigate such 
equations in next section. 
Theorem 1. Defining a set PrfF  for a formula F of PA: 
PrfF := {a∈PrfF | a is a Gödel code of a proof of the formula F of PA}, 
then (1) The set PrfF  is recursive. 
(2) There is a Diophantine equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 such that a∈PrfF if and only if 
DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has solution x0=a and {xw}={xw0}, where #F is the Gödel code of the formula 
 2
F. We call the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 the proof equation of the formula F in PA. 
(3) If DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has solution, then PA┣F. 
(4) There is a formula dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}) in PA as the representation of DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 
such that  
If DPE(#F, b0, {bw})=0, then PA┣ dPE((#F)′, b0′, {bw}′);  
If DPE(#F, b0, {bw})≠0, then PA┣ ┑dPE((#F)′, b0′, {bw}′). 
(5) If DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has solution, then PA┣∃(x0, {xn}) dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}); If PA is 
ω-consistent, then if PA┣ (x∃ 0, {xn}) dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}), then the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 
has solution. 
Remark 2. We are not going to give a formal proof since it is prolix. In fact, the thought of 
the proof is very simple. 
At first, whatever how to implement a project of the Gödel code for PA, a basic character is 
that whether a given natural number a is a Gödel code of a proof of a given formula F is decidable, 
hence whether a∈PrfF  is decidable, that means that PrfF  is a recursive set. 
And then, according to the MRDP theorem[4~6] : A set is recursively enumerable if and only if 
it is Diophantine. Hence, using the effective method given by the completely constructive process 
of proof of the MRDP theorem, we can find out a Diophantine equation DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 for the 
recursive set PrfF such that a∈PrfF if and only if DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 has at least solution 
{xw}={xw0} for a.  
If we regard a in the equation DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 as a unknown, then it is obvious that 
DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 has solution {xw}={xw0} if and only if the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has 
solution x0=a and {xw}={xw0}. 
(3) is obvious according to the definition of proof equation. And, further, if we obtain 
actually a group of obtained solution x0=a and {xw}={xw0} of the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0, 
then we obtain actually a proof of the proposition F from the natural number x0=a. 
(4) and (5) of Theorem 1 are immediate from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, respectively. 
For an arbitrary formula F of PA, starting from the corresponding proof equation DPE(#F, x0, 
{xw})=0 and the representational formula dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}) we can introduce a sequence of 
proof equations and the representational formulas about the formula F as follows. 
 Using F(0)  to denote F, F(1)  to denote the formula ∃(x0,{xw}) dPE((#F)′, x0, {xw}), we 
have the corresponding DPE(#F(1), x10, {xw1})=0 and dPE((#F(1))′, x10, {xw1}). And, using F(2)  to 
denote the formula ∃(x10,{x1w}) dPE((#F(1))′, x10, {xw2}), we have the corresponding DPE(#F(2), x20, 
{xw2})=0 and dPE((#F(2))′, x20, {xw2}). Using F(3) to denote the formula ∃(x20,{xw2}) dPE((#F(2))′, 
x20, {xw2}), we have the corresponding DPE(#F(3), x30, {xw3})=0 and dPE((#F(3))′, x30, {xw3}),……, 
and so on. For these proof equations and the representational formulas, according to Theorem 1 
we have  
Corollary 2. If PA is ω-consistent, then if an arbitrary equation DPE(#F(k), xk0, {xwk})=0 has 
solution, e.g., if PA┣ (x∃ k0,{xwk}) dPE(#F(k))′, xk0, {xkw}), then all equations DPE(#F(n), xn0, 
{xwn})=0 have solution and PA┣F(n) , where n=0, 1, 2, … k－1; F(0)≡F. 
 
2  Some undecidable propositions expressed by Diophantine form in PA 
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 At first, we give the following lemma without proof, since the proof is simple. 
Lemma 3.  
(1) All the following predicates are recursive,  
① FC(a) is true if and only if a is the Gödel code of a formula of PA. 
② Sub(a,b) is true if and only if a is the Gödel code of a formula A(x) of PA with just one 
free variable x, namely, a=#A(x); b is the Gödel code of a formula A(a') obtained from A(x) by 
substituting the numeral a' for the free variable x. 
③ Neg(a,b) is true if and only if a is the Gödel code of a formula A(x) of PA, b is the Gödel 
code of a formula ┑A(x). 
④ U(a,b) is true if and only if a is the Gödel code of a formula A of PA, namely, a=#A; b is 
the Gödel code of a proof of the formula A. 
⑤ V(a,b) is true if and only if a is the Gödel code of a formula A of PA, b is the Gödel code 
of a proof of the formula ┑A. 
(2) Five Diophantine equations DFC(a, {xw1})=0, DSub(a, b, {xw2})=0, DNeg(a, b, {xw3})=0 , 
DU(a, b, {xu})=0 and DV(a, b, {xv})=0 can be constructed according to the MRDP theorem such 
that the predicates FC(a), Sub(a, b), Neg(a, b), U(a, b) and V(a, b) are true if and only if the 
corresponding Diophantine equation DFC(a, {xw1})=0, DSub(a, b, {xw2})=0, DNeg(a, b, {xw3})=0, 
DU(a, b, {xu})=0 and DV(a, b, {xv})=0 have solution, respectively. 
(3) There are corresponding representational formulas dFC(x0, {xw1}), dSub(x1, x2, {xw2}), 
dNeg(x1, x2, {xw3}), dU(x1, x2, {xu}) and dV(x1, x2, {xv}) in PA for the equations DFC(a, {xw1})=0, 
DSub(a, b, {xw2})=0, DNeg(a, b, {xw3})=0, DU(a, b, {xu})=0 and DV(a, b, {xv})=0, respectively. 
In fact, DU(a, b, {xu})=(DFC(a, {xw1}))2+(DPE(a, b, {xw}))2, DV(a, b, {xv})=(DFC(a, 
{xw1}))2+(DNeg(a, x0, {xw3}))2+(DPE(x0, b, {xw}))2, both dU(x1, x2, {xu}) and dV(x1, x2, {xv}) thus 
can be expressed by dFC(x0, {xw1}), dSub(x1, x2, {xw2}) and  dNeg(x1, x2, {xw3}) according to 
Corollary 1. 
Now we consider a formula g1(x) of PA with just one free variable x: 
g1(x) (x↔ ∀ 1, {xw2}) (dSub(x, x1, {xw2}) → ┑∃(x2, {xw}) dPE(x1, x2, {xw})) , 
substituting the numeral (#g1(x))' of the Gödel code of the formula g1(x) for the free variable x in 
g1(x), we obtain a formula G1: 
G1↔ ∀ (x1, {xw2}) (dSub((#g1(x))' , x1, {xw2}) → ┑∃(x2, {xw}) dPE(x1, x2, {xw})) . 
G1 has just the meaning of the Gödel sentence “I am not provable in PA”, for which we have: 
Theorem 2 If PA is consistent, then G1 is not provable in PA; if PA is ω-consistent, then   
┑G1 is not provable in PA. 
Proof: At first, notice that Sub(#g1(x),#G1) is true, namely, the equation DSub(#g1(x), #G1, 
{xw2})=0 has solution, where #G1 is the Gödel code of G1. 
Now we prove that G1 is not provable in PA. Contrarily, suppose PA┣ G1, then the equation 
DPE(#G1, x1, {xw})=0 has solution, and then the equation DG1=(DSub(#g1(x), #G1, {xw2}))2 
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+(DPE(#G1, x2, {xw}))2=0 has solution; Assuming a group of solution are {xw2}={xw20}, 
x2=x20,{xw}={xw0}, according to Theorem 1(3), PA┣ dSub((#g1(x))' , (#G1)' , {xw20}' )∧
dPE((#G1)' , (x20)' , {xw0}' ), hence PA┣ ∃ (x1, {xw2}, x2, {xw}) (dSub((#g1(x))' , x1, {xw2})∧
dPE(x1, x2, {xw})). This is a contradiction with PA┣ G1, because G1↔┑ ∃ (x1, {xw2}, x2, {xw}) 
(dSub((#g1(x))' , x1, {xw2})∧dPE(x1, x2, {xw})). 
Now we prove that ┑G1 is not provable in PA. Contrarily, suppose PA┣ ┑G1, namely, PA
┣ (x∃ 1, {xw2}, x2, {xw}) (dSub((#g1(x))' , x1, {xw2})∧dPE(x1, x2, {xw})), according to Theorem 
1(3) and Theorem 1 (5), if PA is ω-consistent, then the equation DG1=(DSub(#g1(x), #G1, {xw2}))2 
+(DPE(#G1, x2, {xw}))2=0 has solution. However, we have already proved that equation DG1 has no 
solution, a contradiction thus occurs. The Theorem 2 is proved. 
Corollary 3. If PA is consistent, then the equation DG1=(DSub(#g1(x), #G1, {xw2}))2+(DPE(#G1, 
x2, {xw}))2=0 has no solution, but the corresponding representational formula (x∀ 1, {xw2}, x2, 
{xw}) ┑(dSub((#g1(x))' , x1, {xw2})∧dPE(x1, x2, {xw})) is not provable in PA. 
Proof: Immediate from Theorem 2. 
Lemma 4 (Diagonal Theorem)[2]. For an arbitrary formula α(x) of PA with just one free 
variable x, there is a sentence A such that PA┣ A↔α(#A). 
Now consider a formula g2(x) of PA with just one free variable x: 
g2(x)↔ ∀ {xw1} (dFC(x, {xw1}) → ┑∃(x1, {xw}) dPE(x, x1, {xw})) ; 
According to the Lemma 4, there is a sentence G2 such that  
PA┣ G2↔ ∀ {xw1} (dFC((#G2)' , {xw1}) → ┑∃(x1, {xw}) dPE((#G2)' , x1, {xw})) . 
G2 has also just the meaning of the Gödel sentence “I am not provable in PA”, for which we have: 
Theorem 3. If PA is consistent, then G2 is not provable in PA; if PA is ω-consistent, then   
┑G2 is not provable in PA. 
Proof: Notice that FC(#G2) is true, namely, the equation DFC(#G2, {xw1})=0 has solution. The 
rest process of the proof is similar to that of the Theorem 2. 
Corollary 4. If PA is consistent, then the equation DG2=(DFC(#G2, {xw1}))2+(DPE(#G2, x1, 
{xw}))2=0 has no solution, but the corresponding representational formula ∀ ({xw1}, x1, {xw}) ┑
(dFC((#G2)' , {xw1})∧dPE(#G2, x1, {xw})) is not provable in PA. 
The proof of the Corollary 4 is similar to that of the Corollary 3. 
Corollary 5. If PA is consistent, then the equation DPE(#G2, x1, {xw})=0 has no solution, but 
the corresponding representational formula ∀ (x1, {xw}) ┑dPE((#G2)' , x1, {xw}) is not provable 
in PA. 
Proof: If PA┣ ∀ (x1, {xw}) ┑dPE((#G2)' , x1, {xw}), then PA┣ (∀ (x1, {xw}) ┑dPE((#G2)' , 
x1, {xw}))∨Q for an arbitrary formula Q, and in particular  
①       PA┣ (∀ (x1, {xw}) ┑dPE((#G2)' , x0, {xw}))∨┑∃{xw1} dFC((#G2)' , {xw1}) . 
On the other hand, according to the theorem “∀ x(α→β)↔ ∃xα→β (x does not occur freely 
inβ)” in PA, we have 
②      G2↔ ( (x∀ 1, {xw}) ┑dPE((#G2)' , x0, {xw}))∨┑∃{xw1} dFC((#G2)' , {xw1}) . 
From ① and ②, we have PA┣ G2 , this is a contradiction with Theorem 3. 
Now we consider the formula r(x): 
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r(x)↔ (x∀ 1, {xu}) (dU(x, x1, {xu}) → ∃ (x2, {xv}) (x2+{xv}≤x1+{xu}∧dV(x, x2, {xv}))) 
where x1+{xu} and x2+{xv} are the abbreviation of x1+∑xu and x2+∑xv, respectively. According 
to the Lemma 4, there is a sentence R such that  
PA┣ R↔ (x∀ 1,{xu}) (dU((#R)' , x1, {xu}) → 
∃(x2,{xv}) (x2+{xv}≤x1+{xu}∧dV((#R)' , x2, {xv}))) . 
The meaning of R is similar to the Rosser sentence “If I am provable in PA, then for every 
proof of me, there is a shorter proof of my negation”, for which we have: 
Theorem 4. If PA is consistent, then both R and ┑R are not provable in PA. 
Proof: The proof is similar to the Rosser's proof[1, 2, 7] . At first, we prove that R is not provable 
in PA. Contrarily, suppose PA┣ R, then the equation DU(#R, x1, {xu})=0 has solution, assuming a 
group of solution are x1=x10,{xu}={xu0}, then PA┣ dU((#R)', x10', {xu0}'). According to the axiom 
xα(x)→α(x/t) and using the MP rule, we obtain: ∀
   PA┣ (x∃ 2,{xv}) (x2+{xv}≤x10'+{xu0}'∧dV((#R)' , x2, {xv}))            ① 
On the other hand, if PA is consistent, then now ┑R is not provable, and then the equation 
DV(#R, x2, {xv})=0 has no solution, hence PA┣ ┑dV((#R)', x20', {xv0}') for an arbitrary numeral 
x20' and {xv0}'; In particular, PA┣ ┑dV((#R)', 0, {0}), PA┣ ┑dV((#R)', 0', {0}), …, PA┣ ┑
dV((#R)', x20', {xv0}'), where x20'+{xv0}'≤x10'+{xu0}'; and then PA┣ ┑dV((#R)', 0, {0})∧┑
dV((#R)', 0', {0})∧…∧┑dV((#R)', x20', {xv0}'), where x20'+{xv0}'≤x10'+{xu0}'; and then PA┣ 
x∀ 2, {xv} (x2+{xv}≤x10'+{xu0}' → ┑dV((#R)' , x2, {xv}), namely,  
PA┣ ┑ (x∃ 2,{xv}) (x2+{xv}≤x10'+{xu0}'∧dV((#R)' x, x2, {xv})) 
This is a contradiction with ①. 
Now we proof that ┑R is not provable in PA. Contrarily, suppose PA┣ ┑R, then the 
equation DV(#R, x2, {xv})=0 has solution, assuming a group of solution are x2=x20,{xv}={xv0}, then 
(1) PA┣ dV((#R)' , x20', {xv0}'  
(2) PA∪{x20'+{xv0}'≤x1+{xu}┣ {x20'+{xu0}'≤x1+{xu}∧dV((#R)' , x20', {xv0}') 
(3) PA∪{x20'+{xv0}'≤x1+{xu}┣ ∃ x2,{xv}(x2+{xv}≤x1+{xu}∧dV((#R)', x2, {xv})) 
(4) PA┣ x20'+{xv0}'≤x1+{xu}→ ∃ x2,{xv}(x2+{xv}≤x1+{xu}∧dV((#R)', x2, {xv})) 
On the other hand, if PA is consistent, then now R is not provable, and then the equation 
DU(#R, x1, {xu})=0 has no solution, hence PA┣ ┑dU((#R)', x10', {xu0}') for an arbitrary numeral 
x10' and {xu0}'; In particular, PA┣ ┑dU((#R)', 0, {0}), PA┣ ┑dU((#R)', 0', {0}), …, PA┣ ┑
dU((#R)', x10', {xu0}'), where x10'+{xu0}'≤x20'+{xv0}'; and then PA┣ ┑dU((#R)' , 0, {0})∧┑
(dU((#R)' , 0', {0})∧…∧┑dU((#R)', x10', {xu0}'), where x10'+{xu0}'≤x20'+{xv0}'; hence  
(5)  PA┣ x1+{xu}≤x20'+{xv0}'→┑dU((#R)', x1, {xu}) 
(6)  PA┣ dU((#R)' , x1, {xu})→┑(x1+{xu}≤x20'+{xv0}') 
(7) PA┣ ┑(x1+{xu}≤x20'+{xv0}')→x1+{xu}>x20'+{xv0}' 
(8) PA┣ x1+{xu}>x20'+{xv0}'→x1+{xu}≥x20'+{xv0}' 
From (6), (7), (8) and (4) we have 
(9)  PA┣ dU((#R)' , x1, {xu})→ ∃ (x2,{xv}) (x2+{xv}≤x1+{xu}∧dV((#R)', x2, {xv})) 
According to the Gen rule α┣∀ xα, we obtain  
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PA┣ (x∀ 1,{xu}) (dU((#R)' , x1, {xu})→ ∃ (x2,{xv}) (x2+{xv}≤x1+{xu}∧dV((#R)', x2, {xv}))) 
That means PA┣ R and is a contradiction with PA┣ ┑R. 
Corollary 6. If PA is consistent, then the equation DU(#R, x1, {xu})=(DFC(#R, {xw1}))2 
+(DPE(#R, x1, {xw}))2=0 has no solution, but the corresponding representational formula 
(x∀ 1,{xu}) ┑dU((#R)', x1, {xu}) is not provable in PA. 
Proof: The conclusion “The equation DU(#R, x1, {xu})=0 has no solution” has proved in the 
proof of Theorem 4, if PA┣ ∀ (x1,{xu}) ┑dU((#R)', x1, {xu}), then PA┣ ∀ (x1,{xu}) (┑
dU((#R)', x1, {xu})∨Q) for an arbitrary formula Q, and in particular PA┣ ∀ (x1,{xu}) (┑dU((#R)', 
x1, {xu})∨ (x∃ 2,{xv}) (x2+{xv}≤x1+{xu}∧dV(x, x2, {xv}))), this means PA┣ R  and is a 
contradiction with Theorem 4. 
Remark 3. For obtaining the conclusion “There are some Diophantine equations for which 
we know that they have no solutions, but these facts cannot be proved in the PA”, from the proof 
of Corollary 3, 4, 5 and 6 we see that what we use is only “PA is consistent” but not “PA is 
ω-consistent”. This is not inconsistent with the conclusions in the Ref. [3]. We state the Theorem 2 
in the Ref. [3] as follows: “There is a finitely axiomatizable consistent extension D of Q in which 
all Diophantine sentence are decidable.” However, the system D is in fact essentially different 
from Q or PA, because, from the axiom D3 (∃ z∀ x (x+z=z)) in the Ref. [3] we see, D is a system 
containing an infinite element. In such system, “all Diophantine sentence are decidable” is not 
surprising; just as the discussion in the Ref. [3], in a nonstandard model M (which is used as the 
model of D) containing an infinite element ∞ , an arbitrary Diophantine equation 
P({xm})=Q({xm}) have a trivial solution ∞, unless P or Q are polynomials of degree zero. And, 
further, even if the nonstandard model M can be used as the model of Q or PA, and hence all 
provable formulas are true in M, we still have not the conclusion that all true sentences are 
provable in Q or PA (This is just what the incompleteness theorem shows). In fact, the true 
sentence “all Diophantine sentence are decidable” in M is surely not a theorem in the system Q or 
PA, because there is not an infinite element in Q or PA, namely, there is not an axiom like D3 
( z x (x+z=z)) to guarantee the existence of an infinite element in Q or PA. ∃ ∀
Lemma 5. Let B(x) be (x∃ 1, {xw}) dPE(x, x1, {xw}), then if PA is consistent, then for an 
arbitrary formula A, 
(P1)  If PA┣ A, then PA┣ B(#A); 
(P2)  PA┣ B(#A) →B(#(B(#A))). 
If PA is ω-consistent, then for arbitrary formulas A1, A2, 
(P3)  PA┣ B(#(A1→ A2)) →(B(#A1)→ B(#A2)). 
Proof: (P1) Immediate from the definitions of proof equation and B(x) and Theorem 1(5). 
(P2) If PA┣ B(#A), then the equation DPE(#(B(#A)), x1, {xw})=0 has solution, assuming a 
group of solution are x1=x10,{xw}={xw0}, then PA┣ dPE((#(B(#A)))', x10', {xw0}'), and then PA┣ 
x∃ 1, {xw} dPE((#(B(#A)))', x1, {xw}), namely, PA┣ B(#(B(#A))). 
(P3) If PA┣ B(#(A1 → A2)), according to Theorem 1(5), if PA is ω-consistent, then the 
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equation DPE(#(A1 → A2), x1, {xw})=0 has solution, according to Theorem 1(3) we have PA┣ A1 
→ A2.Similarly, if PA┣ B(#A1), then PA┣ A1. Using the MP rule we have PA┣ A2, then we 
have PA┣ B(# A2). The (P3) of Lemma 5 is proved. 
Lemma 6 (Löb's Theorem)[2, 8]. Let B(x) be ∃(x1, {xw}) dPE(x, x1, {xw}), then for an 
arbitrary formula A, if PA┣ B(#A) → A, the PA┣A. 
Remark 4. The properties (P1) ~ (P3) in Lemma 5 is so called “Löb's derivability 
conditions”[2]. According to Lemma 5, both Löb's Theorem and the provability of the Henkin 
sentence[2, 8, 9] H↔ ∃(x1, {xw}) dPE((#H)' , x1, {xw}) in PA can be proved easily. However, in 
literatures, what used condition in the proof that the provability predicate B(x) satisfies (P1) ~ (P3) 
is only “PA is consistent”, but we have to use the condition “PA is ω-consistent” for the proof of 
the property (P3) in Lemma 5, this is also the reason that we use the condition “PA is 
ω-consistent” in the both proofs of below Lemma 7 and Theorem 5. 
Lemma 7. If PA is ω-consistent and B(x)↔ ∃(x1, {xw}) dPE(x, x1, {xw}), then for an 
arbitrary formula A, if A is an axiom or a theorem in PA, then not PA┣ ┑B(#(┑A)). 
Proof: Suppose PA┣ ┑B(#(┑A)), then PA┣ B(#(┑A)) → F for any sentence F, and in 
particular PA┣ B(#(┑A)) → ┑A, and according to Lemma 6 we have PA┣ ┑A. On the other 
hand, A is an axiom or a theorem in PA, we therefore have also PA┣ A. PA is thus inconsistent. 
In fact, Lemma 7 is the abstract form[2] of the Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. For 
the below proof of Theorem 5, what we need is only this abstract form. 
Theorem 5. If PA is ω-consistent, then for any axiom or theorem in the PA, there is a 
corresponding Diophantine equation, for which we know that it has no solutions, but this fact 
cannot be proved in the PA. 
Proof: For any axiom or theorem A, ┑A is not provable in PA, namely, the equation 
DPE(#(┑A), x1, {xw})=0 has no solution; however, if PA┣ ∀ (x1,{xw}) ┑dPE((#(┑A))', x1, {xw}), 
namely, PA┣ ┑B(#(┑A)), this is a contradiction with Theorem 5.  
Notice that Theorem 5 means that, for every axiom and theorem in the PA, there is a 
corresponding undecidable proposition. And, further, the corresponding undecidable proposition 
can be constructed actually and has the Diophantine form. Theorem 5 shows that undecidable 
propositions in PA are at least as many as the axioms and theorems of PA. 
 
3  A project translating the task seeking a proof of the mathematical proposition 
into solving a corresponding Diophantine equation 
 
Generalizing the idea of proof equation to any mathematical (set theoretical, number 
theoretical, algebraic, geometrical, topological, et al) proposition, in principle, the task seeking a 
proof of the mathematical proposition may be translated into solving a corresponding Diophantine 
equation. Of course, maybe it is also difficult to solve a Diophantine equation, however, this is 
another kind of question.  
The method of constructing the corresponding Diophantine equation for solving a 
mathematical problem has been discussed, see, for example, Ref. [3, 4, 5, 10]. However, our 
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project differs from the method given by the Ref. [3, 4, 5, 10]. In the Ref. [3, 4, 5, 10], special 
analysis and discussion are necessary for every special mathematical problem, respectively. What 
project we present is universal. 
As the first step of the project, for a proposition F of a mathematical system S, we construct a 
corresponding formal system S, namely, S is as a model of S. Especially, there is a formula F in S 
to express the proposition F of S.  
Notice that what we want to do is to seek a proof for a proposition but not for studying a 
formal system, hence, the construction of S is comparatively arbitrary. For example, if the formula 
F is not provable in S, notice that it does not mean that the proposition F is also not provable in 
the mathematical system S, then we can add new symbol, new axiom, extend to second-order 
system from first-order system, etc, to obtain another “stronger” formal system S′ than S, and try 
to seek a proof for the proposition F using the “stronger” system S′. 
And, further, we can add some known theorems into S as axioms, because (1) If we start 
from the axioms to prove a formula of S, then maybe the proof is too lengthy; (2) Mathematicians 
start usually from known theorems to prove a mathematical proposition. 
Of course, although the construction of the formal system S is comparatively arbitrary, some 
basic conditions must be satisfied. What we ask is merely whether a given symbol is one of the 
symbols, a sequence consisting of the symbols of S is a formula, and a sequence consisting of the 
formulas of S is a proof of a formula of S are decidable after the symbols, formulas and proof of a 
given formula in S are defined. 
And then, we implement the Gödel code for S, for which what we ask is merely that whether 
a given natural number is the Gödel code of a symbol, a given natural number is the Gödel code of 
a formula, and a given natural number is the Gödel code of a proof of a formula of S are 
decidable. 
For the formula F of S, we define a set PrfF consisting of natural numbers such that a∈PrfF 
if and only if a is a Gödel code of a proof of F. 
Because there is an effective method for determining whether a given natural number is the 
Gödel code of a proof of a given formula of S, the set PrfF is thus recursive. And then, using the 
effective method given by the completely constructive process of proof of the MRDP theorem, we 
can find out a Diophantine equation DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 for the recursive set ΞF such that a∈PrfF 
if and only if DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 has at least a solution {xw}={xw0} for a. 
The last step of the project is that we regard a in the equation DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 as a 
unknown variable and try to solve the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0. We call the equation    
DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 the proof equation of the formula F in S. 
There are great differences between equations DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 and DPE(#F, x0,  {xw})=0. 
For example, whether the equation DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 has solution for a is decidable, because the 
set PrfF is recursive. And according to the algorithm deciding whether a given natural number 
belongs to the set PrfF if we know a∈PrfF then we also know that DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 has 
solution for a; Conversely, if we know a∉PrfF then we also know the solution of the equation 
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DPE(#F, a, {xw})=0 does not exist. However, if we want to use the same method to decide whether 
there is a solution of the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0, then if it has no solution then we have to 
check all natural numbers for the variable x0 and the process never stop, we therefore do not know 
actually whether the solution exists. 
For the proof equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0, we have the following conclusions:  
(1) DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has a group of solution x0=a, {xw}={xw0} if and only if DPE(#F, a, 
{xw})=0 has a group of solution {xw}={xw0}.  
(2) If DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0 has solution, then the formula F is provable in S and a proof of F 
is actually obtained from the natural number x0=a, we therefore obtain a proof of the proposition F 
of the mathematical system S and F is turned into a theorem of S. 
(3) If there is not any solution of the equation DPE(#F, x0, {xw})=0, namely, the formula F is 
not provable in S, then we can further consider the formula ¬F in S and corresponding 
Diophantine equation DPE(#(¬F), x0, {xw})=0, where #(¬F) is the Gödel code of the formula ¬F.  
① If DPE(#(¬F), x0, {xw})=0 has solution, then the formula ¬F is provable in S and a proof 
of ¬F is actually obtained from the natural number x0=a, we therefore obtain a proof of the 
proposition ¬F of the mathematical system S and ¬F is turned into a theorem of S. 
② If there is also not any solution of the equation DPE(x0, #(¬F), {xw})=0, then the formula 
¬F is also not provable in S. Now that both formulas F and ¬F are not provable in S, the formula 
F is undecidable in S. 
In particular, if a formula F with the universal quantifier ∀  is undecidable in S, then we 
know actually sometimes that the corresponding proposition F is true. 
(4) If F is undecidable in S, notice that it does not mean that the proposition F is also not 
provable in the mathematical system S, then we have to try to construct another “stronger” formal 
system S′than S and repeat the above steps if we want to try to seek a proof to the proposition F 
via the method of solving proof equation. 
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